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ON SOME CATEGORIES FOR DESCRIBING 
THE SEMOLEXEMIC STRUCTURE 
by Yoshihiko Ikegami 
1. A lexeme is the minimum unit that carries meaning. Thus a lexeme can 
be a "word" a s  well as an  affix (i.e., something smaller than a word) or an  
idiom (i.e,, something larger than a word). 
2. A sememe is a unit of meaning that can be realized as a single lexeme. It 
is defined as a structure constituted by those features having distinctive 
functions (i.e., serving to  distinguish the sememe in question from other 
semernes that contrast with it).' 
A question that arises a t  this point is whether or not one lexeme always 
corresponds to  just one serneme and no  more. Three theoretical positions are 
foreseeable: ( I )  one which holds that one lexeme always corresponds to just 
one sememe and no more, (2) one which holds that one lexeme corresponds to 
an indefinitely large number of sememes, and (3) one which holds that one 
lexeme corresponds to  a certain limited number of sememes. These three 
positions wiIl be referred to as (1 )  the "Grundbedeutung" theory, (2) the "use" 
theory, and (3) the "polysemy" theory, respectively. 
The Grundbedeutung theory, however attractive in itself, is to be rejected 
as unrealistic. Suppose a preliminary analysis has revealed that a lexeme 
seems to be used sometimes in an "abstract" sense and sometimes in a "concrete" 
sense. In order to posit a Grundbedeutung under such circumstances, it is to be 
assumed that there is a still higher level at which "abstract" and "concrete" are 
neutralized-this is certainly a theoretical possibility, but it seems highly 
unlikely and unrealistic from a psychological point of view. 
Jakobson's study of the meanings of the Russian cases, which is a classical 
example of the application of the Grundbedeutung approach, will be worth 
discussing in this connection.' According to Jakobson (1936), the meaning 
(i.e., Grundbedeutung") of the genitive case, for example, is said to  be that 
"der Umfang der Teilnahme des Gegenstandes am Sachverhalte der Aussage 
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geringer als sein gesamtes Umfang ist." The  definition can be proved inade- 
quate by pointing out either that a case other than the genitive can be used in 
a way that fits the definition or that the genitive can be used in a way that does 
not fit the definition. Compare, on the one hand, the two expressions, John's 
arrival and John arrives. Since John's role in the event referred to is the same 
in both cases, Jakobson's definition intended for the genitive also applies to 
(at least certain uses of) the nominative. Compare, on the other hand, expres- 
sions like tinre's river and the city of Rome (here assuming that the ofphrase 
is functionally equivalent to  the genitive). If, as is often said, these are really 
examples of "apposition," Jakobson's definition does not logically apply here.' 
The use theory, which in its extreme form claims that a lexeme is used in a 
new sense every time it is used in a new context (thus implying that there is no 
such thing as  "~ememe"),~ is to be rejected on empirical grounds, If this claim 
were true, the speaker would be unable to guess the meaning of an already 
familiar lexeme used in a context he encounters for the first time-which is 
not really the case, Similarly, if the number of the meanings of any lexeme 
were infinite, no speaker would ever be able to master a language to a satis- 
factory degree-which is again not really the case. 
If both the Grundbedeutung theory and the use theory are to be rejected, 
the polysemy theory will seem to offer the most realistic solution. The polysemy 
theory, however, must be able to show just how many sememes can most 
reasonably be posited as correlated with the lexeme in question. In other words, 
given a preliminary analysis in which a certain number of senses are tentatively 
posited for a lexeme, the theory must explain on what criteria certain senses 
are to be collapsed (as one generic sense, or more technically speaking, as 
representing one sememe) and certain others are to be kept separate (as poly- 
semous senses, or as representing different sememes). 
The judgment can be made in the following way: Suppose a preliminary 
analysis has tentatively posited three senses (i.e., three possible sememes), SI ,  
s?, and ST, for the lexeme in question. Check whether there is a set of common 
semantic features for s l ,  SI, and si. If there is not, S I ,  sz, and ST are poly- 
semous senses (i.e., separate sememes). If there is, then check further whether 
S I ,  Sz, and s, mutually contrast with regard to  this set of common features 
and jointly exhaust all the possible cases in which they are relevant to the same 
set of common features. If they do  not, S I ,  s?, and si are polysemous senses 
(i.e., separate sememes). If they do, they can be collapsed into a single generic 
sense (i.e., they constitute one sememe). The whole procedure can be summar- 
ized as follows: 
-€ 
No - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  polysemy 
Common feature(s)? No ---polysemy 
Yes - Exhaustive coverage? 
Yes - - -generic 
sense 
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Suppose, for example, that the lexeme child is tentatively analyzed as having 
two senses, 'male young human'and 'female young h ~ m a n . ' ~  There is a set of 
common semantic features, 'young human.' 'Male' and 'female' constitute a 
neatly contrasting pair with regard to the set of features, 'young human'; they 
also jointly exhaust all the possible cases in which they are relevant to the 
same set of common features tie. ,  children are either male or female). The two 
senses are therefore to be collapsed into 'young human'; in other words, child 
represents a case of generic sense. 
Suppose next that the 1exeme.father is tentatively assigned three senses, 
'male parent,"progenitor,'and 'Catholic priest.' A common feature for them 
would be 'human.' But 'being male,' 'being a progenitor,' and 'being a Catholic 
priest' do not well contrast with regard to the feature 'human,'much less jointly 
exhaust all the possible ways of human existence. The three senses, therefore, 
represent a case of polysemy. 
Suppose, third, that the lexeme character. is assigned two senses, 'a written 
symbol' and 'a distinctive quality,'among others. I t  would not seem possible 
to define a set of features common to those two senses and the two senses must 
be kept separate, i.e., they are polysemous senses. 
It will be noticed that there are two stages at which tentatively defined 
senses are judged to be polysemous. These two stages represent the different 
degrees to which the tentatively defined senses differ from each other. Those 
judged to be polysemous at the first stage (e.g., character) represent a clearer 
case of polysemy (i.e., there is agreatersemantic distance between them) than 
those judged to be polysemous at the second stage (e.g., father). The latter are 
closer to a case of generic sense. The degree of certainty with which a judgment 
about mutual contrastiveness and exhaustive coverage can be made may of 
course differ delicately from one case to another. This, however, simply reflects 
the inherent indeterminacy of the semantic system of human language. 
3. Suppose the number of sememes that correspond to a given lexeme is 
defined in this way. We will then find the following types of correspondence 
(Lamb 1964):' 
( I )  Simple realization: one lexeme-one sememe, e.g., hydrogen. Typical 
examples are found among technical terms. 
(2) Neutralization: one lexeme-more than one sememe, e.g., man- 
'human being,' 'male human,' 'husband,' 'servant,' etc. This is a case of poly- 
semy. 
(3) Diversification: more than one lexeme-one sememe, e.g., oculist and 
eye-doctor (apart from different stylistic values). This is a case of synonymy. 
(4) Empty realization: one lexeme-no sememe, e.g., there as in there is a 
book.8 
(5) Zero realization: no lexeme-one sememe, e.g., the sememe of'goal'as 
in creep under a bed (cf. creep from under a bed). 
Obviously, the notion of zero realization cannot be employed indiscrimi- 
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nately. If one should decide, for example, that there is zero realization of the 
sememe 'come' after the preposition to in you may come ifyou want to, one 
would have to posit zero realization for any verb that could occur in place of 
come in the above sentence (e.g., you may stay ifyou want to, you may stand ij 
you want to, etc.). This would be a highly undesirable consequence. It is 
obvious that cases like this had better be described as deletion transformation 
rather than real i~at ion.~ 
4. Componentially, sememes do not exclude each other. In other words, a 
sememe (or more precisely, a semantic unit that constitutes a sememe) can 
be a component part of another sememe. (Consider the taxonomical structure 
that characterizes many parts of the lexicon of any language. Thus a semantic 
unit constituting a sememe realized as child is part of the semantic unit 
constituting a sememe realized as boy or of the one constituting a sememe 
realized as girl.) This overlapping in structure is characteristic of the semantic 
system and contrasts it in acharacteristic way with the phonological system of 
language. 
Consider the following hypothetical parallelism. Suppose that a certain 
language had a set of three phonemes whose compositions are as follows: 
/p / :  'closed' + 'labial' + 'unvoiced' 
/ b/: 'closed' + 'labial' + 'voiced' 
/ P/: klosed' + 'labial' 
Structurally, this is parallel to the following set of sememes: 
BOY: 'human' + 'young' + 'male' 
GIRL: 'human' + 'young' + 'female' 
CHILD: 'human' + 'young' 
It has already been noted that a structure like this is not at all uncommon in the 
semantic system of language. On the other hand, it will not be difficult to see 
that a language, part of whose phonological system is constructed as shown 
above, is not very likely, because one would then constantly be at a loss to judge 
whether the sound intended by the speaker is / p /  or /P I ,  or / b/ or / P/ as the 
case may be. This would no doubt lead to more confusion in communication 
than could possibly be tolerated. Thus there is an important structural differ- 
ence between the way in which sememes are constituted by distinctive semantic 
features and the way in which phonemes are constituted by distinctive phono- 
logical features: a sememe can incorporate as its constituent part a set of 
semantic features that is realized as another sememe, but a phoneme does not 
seem to incorporate as its constituent part a set of phonological features that is 
realized as another phoneme in the same language.'' 
5. We now proceed to discuss how a semantic unit (itself capable of 
functioning as a sememe) is combined with another semantic unit (also itself 
capable of functioning as a sememe), so as to constitute a semantic unit of 
larger size that functions as a sememe in the language in question. There are 
two types of combination: incorporation and presupposition. 
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5.1.1. Incorporation can be seen, for example, when the sememes GO and 
ACROSS are combined to produce CROSS, a sememe to  be realized as the 
lexeme cross (as in crossa bridge). The sememes combined may be on approx- 
imately the same footing, as in MAN>" (= either 'male human' or 'human 
male'>, or one sememe is dominant and the other is, as it were, absorbed into 
it, as in CROSS just mentioned. The former case can be considered as a special 
case of the latter and the term incorporation will be used to cover both cases. 
"Incorporation" is one of the key notions in Gruber (1976), where three 
possible cases are distinguished: 
(1) Obligatory incorporation of an obligatory element 
(2) Optional incorporation of an obligatory element 
(3) Optional incorporation of an optional eIement 
E.g.: ( I )  ACROSS is an obligatory element for the meaning of cross. 
Cross the bridge, but not *cross across the bridge, is acceptable. The 
incorporation of CROSS, therefore, is obligatory. 
(2) THROUGH is an obligatory element for the meaning of pierce. 
Both pierce the cushion and pierce through the cushion are acceptable. 
The incorporation of THROUGH, therefore, is optional. 
(3) UP is an optional element of the meaning of climb because not 
only climb up the ladder, but also climb down the ladder, climb into the 
tent, etc., are possible. Both climb the ladder and climb up the ladder are 
acceptable. The incorporation of UP, therefore, is optional. 
Gruber further mentions a logically possible fourth case, namely, "obligatory 
incorporation of an optional element,"and adds that if such acase did exist, it 
would not conveniently be described by his representation. 
It can be argued against Gruber's scheme that cases (3) and (4) d o  not have 
to be posited after all. Two things can be pointed out in this connection. One 
problem is with the term "optionalelement." If a certain semantic element is 
optional for the meaning of a lexeme, it does not have to  be specified as a 
component part of the meaning of the lexeme, because it does not bear a 
distinctive function for the meaning of the lexeme (i.e., does not serve to 
distinguish the meaning of the lexeme from the meanings of other lexemes in 
the same language). (Notice that MALE, LINEAL, and ONEGENERATION ABOVE 
EGO are specified for,father, because these semantic elements distinguish the 
meaning of the lexemefather from the meanings of such lexemes as mother, 
uncle, and son, respectively, but that there is no need to specify STRONG, for 
example, for father, because there does not exist in English a pair of lexemes 
in which one refers to "a strong fatherwand the other to "a not strong father.") 
The other problem is that Gruber's scheme is suspiciously based on a 
Grundbedeutung approach. U P  is certainly optional for the meaning of climb, 
as Gruber thinks, only if a single totalmeaning is to  be posited for the lexeme. 
But consider the fact that although the directionality of motion is irrelevant 
for climb when it  is used as  an intransitive verb, it will only be understood as 
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referring to  a downward movement when used as a transitiveverb (e.g., climb 
the ladder). This points to  the need for givinga special treatment t o  those uses 
in which climb refers to an upward movement, in other words, for describing 
the meaning of climb in terms of polysemy. Thus in the sense in which climb 
refers t o  an upward movement, UP is an obligatory element. At thesame time, 
it is possible to say in this particular sense either climb the ladder or  climb up 
the ladder. The incorporation of UP, therefore, is optional. This will allow us 
to classify the verb as  belonging to the same category as pierce. In the other 
sense, in which climb refers simply t o  a creeping motion, however, neither 
UP nor DOWN-or INTO, etc., for that matter-is an obligatory element for the 
meaning of climb; they d o  not undergo incorporation, either. They do not, 
therefore, have to  be specified in describing the meaning of climb. 
5.1.2. Theoretically, three ways of describing incorporation will be 
conceivable. One is to represent it as a Boolean union, as is seen in the early 
stage of the Katzian approach (see Katz and Fodor 1964). This seems to be all 
right so long as the semantic units concerned are approximately on equal 
footing, as in HUMAN,  MALE, and YOUNG for boy. But when this is not the 
case, as in GO and ACROSS for cross, the method is highly unsatisfactory, It 
fails to  reflect the obvious fact that GO is the head and ACROSS is subordinate 
to it. 
A second way of representation is to recognize the unequal relationship, as 
is seen in Weinreich's proposed emendation (Weinreich 1966) of the early 
Katzian approach. Besides "linking" (as in OFFSPRING and FEMALE for 
daughter), Weinreich posits "nesting," a relationship in which one element is 
specified by the other (as in FURNITURE - FOR SITTING). Weinreich's proposal 
is obviously an improvement over the early Katzian approach, but can be 
further refined. To  say that one element is specified by the other is not enough. 
For the purpose of semantic representation, it must be made clear in what 
respect it is specified. Weinreich perhaps already had this point in mind when he 
represented one of the elements FOR SITTING (and not simply SITTING). But 
FOR is itself a recurrent element and can be given an independent status as a 
semantic unit. Then, parallel to FOR (purpose), we have a series of such relating 
features as AS A RESULT OF (result), AT THE SAME TIME AS (simultaneity), as 
well as ACROSS, FROM, IN, ON, TO, etc. 
This brings us to a third type of representation in which sememes are 
combined through the mediation of a relating feature specifying in what kind 
of relationship they are combined. Notice that the thing I call a relating 
feature here is also a sememe and is usually realized as a lexeme having a 
prepositional or a conjunctional function. In contrast, we will introduce a term 
proper fearure to designate a sememe combined through a relating feature. 
Incorporation can then be classified into the foIlowing three categories, 
depending on the kind and size of the semantic unit involved in incorporation: 
(i) a proper feature (or a semantic unit with a proper feature as head) 
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(ii) a relating feature + a proper feature (or a semantic unit with a proper 
feature as head) 
(a) only a relating feature incorporated 
(b) both a relating feature and a proper feature (or a semantic unit 
with a proper feature as head) 
(iii) a relating feature + a propositional structure 
Examples (the semantic units that are incorporated are shown in 
brackets): 
(i) CHILD = HUMAN + [YOUNG] 
GLIDE = GO + [SMOOTH] 
(ii) (a) CROSS = G O  + [ACROSS] 
ACCOMPANY = GO + [WITH] 
(b) DRIVE = G O  + [BY + CAR] 
FLY = GO + [IN + AIR] 
(iii) BRING = COME + [AT THE SAME TIME AS + HAVE] 
CHASE = GO + [IN ORDER T O  + BE BY] 
5.2. The distinction between incorporation and presupposition can be 
seen by comparing the sememes MARE and GALLOP. It is clear that a semantic 
unit HORSE is involved in either case, but HORSE is one of the semantic 
features that constitute the inherent property of the sememe MARE, while this 
is not the case with GALLOP. With GALLOP, HORSE is a tactically presupposed 
feature of a semantic unit whose inherent property is representable as some- 
thing like GO + ALL FEET O F F  GROUND TOGETHER IN EACH STRIDE. 
5.2.1. Presupposition in the present text can be understood either in a 
restrictive or  in a n  interpretive sense. In a restrictive sense, presupposition 
specifies a range of sememes with which the semantic unit representing the 
inherent feature is allo~)ed to enter into combination. If the sememe with 
which it combines falls within this range, the resulting combination is judged 
semotactically well-formed; if not, semotactically ill-formed. In an interpretive 
sense, presupposition specifies a range of sememes with which the semantic unit 
representing the inherent feature is expected to enter into combination. If the 
sememe with which it combines falls within this range, the resulting combi- 
nation is judged normal; if not, deviant. 
The difference is crucial. In the restrictive sense, a combination not fulfilling 
the conditions specified is simply rejected. In the interpretive sense, it is rein- 
terpreted (or at least checked for reinterpretation) as if the conditions specified 
were fulfilled. Thus an expression like aflovvei snliles will be rejected outright 
in the restrictive view, while in the interpretive view, it is reinterpreted as a 
case of personification, as if the flower were endowed with the feature HUMAN. 
Since the restrictive view is obviously too strong, excluding all metaphorical 
expressions as illegitimate, the interpretive view is here  referr red." 
5.2.2. Not all sememes have their range of presupposition specified." In 
the sense in which we are now considering it, presupposition is one-way (and 
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not mutual) determination. There is a hierarchical relationship in this respect 
among different types of sememes.I4 
For example, sememes of the 'action' or 'change of state' type (e.g., GO, 
NEIGH, DIE, etc.) presuppose sememes of the 'thing' type (i.e., 'actions' and 
'changes of state' have the semantic range of'things'specified that are capable 
of performing those actions and of undergoing those changes of state, respec- 
tively). Similarly, sememes of 'quality' type (e.g., GOOD, YOUNG, LOVELY, 
etc.) also presupposesememes of 'thing'type (i.e., 'qualities'have the semantic 
range of 'things' specified that possess those qualities). Notice that in either 
case the presupposition works only in one way. NEIGH presupposes HORSE, 
but not vice versa; there are many things a horse can d o  besides neighing. DIE 
presupposes ANIMATE, but animate beings undergo other changes than 
dying, too. LOVELY presupposes FEMALE or NON-ADULT, but being lovely is 
not the only state in which a female or  a child can be. 
In the same way, sememes representing 'relating features' presuppose 
sememes of either 'thing' type or  of 'proposition' type, as the case may be. 
ACROSS, for example, presupposes SPACE, but not vice versa. 
Sememes of the 'action' or 'change of state' type, while presupposing 
sememes of the 'thing' type as noted above, are in turn presupposed by sememes 
of the 'manner' type. Similarly, sememes of the 'quality' type are themselves 
presupposed by sememes of the 'degree' type. Thus VIOLENT and TO A HIGH 
DEGREE presuppose ACTION and QUALITY, respectively, but not vice versa. 
Thus sememes of the 'thing' type stand at the top of a hierarchical relation- 
ship, presupposed by others but apparently not presupposingany other. They 
do, however, have presuppositions of their own-but presuppositions of a 
different kind. The presupposition of sememes of the 'thing' type seems to  be 
that there exist such 'things' as are referred t o  by them. Thus the sememe 
STONE, for example, presupposes that in the world of the English-speaking 
people there exist 'things'referred to by a lexeme (or a set of lexemes) realizing 
this sememe. Insofar as this presupposition refers to the world of reality, it is 
different from the kind of presupposition we have been considering above. 
It may appear that the hierarchical relationship of presupposition we have 
described can also be defined in terms of parts of speech. Thus for example, 
"verbs" and "adjectives" can apparently be described a s  presupposing certain 
kinds of "nouns." That this formulation is not correct will easily be seen if we 
consider nominalized verbs and adjectives. Death and lo~~elines.~ are nouns, 
but they need the same semantic range of application specified as theverb die 
and the adjective  love(^^, respectively. This consequence is only naturaI, since 
parts of speech are surface categories (belonging to the lexemic stratum), while 
the presuppositional relationship we are considering operates at a deeper level 
(belonging to the tactical component of the sememic stratum). 
5.2.3. In describing presupposition, two types of sememes are to be specified. 
Sememes of one of these refer to the inherent property; sememes of the other 
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refer to the functional property. Thus for a sememe like NEIGH, it is necessary to 
specify as its range of presupposition not only HORSE (inherent property) but 
also AGENT (functional property). This two-fold specification is necessary, 
because there is no one-to-one correspondence between the categories for 
inherent property and those for functional property. Thus consider ANIMATE 
and INANIMATE, on the one hand, and AGENT and NON-AGENT, on the other. 
INANIMATE can indeed only be NON- AGENT,'^ but ANIMATE can be either 
AGENT or NOW- AGENT.'^ Thus a sentence like hemovedis ambiguous between 
two interpretations; he may have moved of his own will or he may have moved 
because he was pushed, etc. 
Not all sememes, however, have this two-fold specification. Sememes of 
the 'action' type typically need specification as to  both the inherent and the 
functional property of the sememes they presuppose. But sememes of 'change 
ofstate' type as well as those of 'state'or 'quality'type need only to  be specified 
as to the inherent property of the sememes they presuppose. Thus it is relevant 
to specify whether John in John movedrepresents a n  AGENT or  a NON-AGENT. 
But it would seem highly irrelevant to  ask whether John in John diedrepre- 
sents an AGENT (e.g., committed suicide) or a NON- AGENT(^.^., was killed in a 
car crash). 'Change of state' verbs refer primarily to the consequence of a 
change and d o  not significantly concern themselves with whether or not the 
change is produced on purpose. For 'state' verbs, the possibility of AGENT 
interpretation is eliminated. 
5.2.4. Sememes referring to  an inherent property that are presupposed by 
other sememes are presumed to constitute a subset of all the sememes in the 
language. It is tempting to  suppose that sememes presupposed by others are 
those referring to  generic (and therefore likely to  be employed frequently) 
rather than specific (and therefore likely to  be employed less frequently) 
categories. There is no guarantee that this will always hold. Consider a 
community in which a special social significance (e.g., taboo) is given to a 
certain object. It is easily conceivable that the language of this community 
provides its speakers with special vocabulary to be used when referring to  
such an object (e.g., a word for'visit'as applied to the Emperor, as was once 
the case in Japanese). The extreme case would be a language in which every 
conceivable particular object is provided with a specific lexeme (with its 
correlated sememe). Such a language could not possibly exist, because the 
burden it would impose on the speaker's memory would be well beyond the 
capacity of the human brain. There should, therefore, be a certain natural 
boundary to  the degree to which the category of the sememe presupposed can 
be specific. But it is impossible to say apr ior i  how specific it can be, because 
the categorization depends on cultural factors, which can be different from 
one language community to  another. 
5.2.5. Sememes that refer to a functional property and that are presupposed 
by other sememes will not be numerous. If anything approaching a list of 
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'universal' sememes should ever be possible, it would concern not sememes 
referring to inherent properties, but those referring to  functional properties. 
Fillmore's case grammar was interested in this task and at its final stage arrived 
at a list of eight cases: AGENT, EXPERIENCER, INSTRUMENT, OBJECT, SOURCE, 
GOAL, LOCATION, and TIME (Fillmore 197 1). The approach Fillmore chose 
was an inductive one, but because of the uncertainty as to how much con- 
textual meaning could be read into the meaning of the case, the list he pro- 
posed impressed one as indeterminate and unconvincing. 
Perhaps we could also try a deductive approach. It may help us, if not to 
arrive a t  a final list of cases, at least to be convinced that the number of cases 
must remain indeterminate. For example, on the basis of a localistic hypothesis, 
we could start with four fundamental cases, OBJECT, on the one hand, and 
SOURCE, GOAL, and LOCATION, on the other, to represent motion ( X  GO FROM 
Y, X GO TOY)  and existence (X BE AT Y) in space." But if we leave the concrete 
level and come to think of the same set of relationships a t  an  abstract level, 
then SOURCE, GOAL, and LOCATION will correspond to CAUSE, RESULT, and 
COMITATIVE, respectively. Or again, if SOURCE, GOAL, and LOCATION are 
represented by a human being (potentially capable of acting and feeling) and 
are assigned priviIeged positions in sentence structure, then the three cases 
will be reinterpreted as AGENT, BENEFICIARY, and POSSESSOR, r e ~ ~ e c t i v e ~ y . ' ~  
(Cf. The ball went away from John - John threwlpushed, etc., the ballaway, 
The ball came to John -- John got the ball, The baII was with John - John 
had the ball.) Furthermore, LOCATION can stand outside a propositional 
structure (i.e., AT Y +PROPOSITION) as wellas inside a proposition, as we have 
already seen (i.e., x BE AT Y). If then the mode is changed from spatial to  
temporal, we have BEGINNING, END, and TIME corresponding to  SOURCE, 
GOAL, and LOCATION, respectively (e.g., In New York, something happened 
-- In the morning, something happened). We thus have the following list: 
Concrete Abstract Human Time 
Mode Mode Mode Mode 
SOURCE CAUSE AGENT BEGINNING 
GOAL RESULT BENEFICIARY END 
LOCATION COMITATIVE POSSESSOR TIME 
OBJECT 
We see that some of these possible cases are commonly discussed in the 
literature, but some (e.g., CAUSE, BEGINNING, END) are not. Further deriva- 
tion of cases is also possible. INSTRUMENT, for example, is clearly related to  
COMITATIVE; it is a variant of COMITATIVE in the environment in which 
causation is involved, But we will not discuss this problem any further here. 
5.3. We have so far assumed the distinction between incorporation and 
presupposition. In fact, the two categories show different behaviors with 
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regard to redundancy. Male boy, for example, is an unmistakably redundant 
This can be accounted for by sayingthat BOY has a sememe MALE 
incorporated into it and that this and the same sememe represented by male 
produce redundancy. A horse neighed, on the other hand, is semantically not 
redundant. HORSE is not an inherent feature for NEIGH but is only presup- 
posed by it, and the presupposition is fulfilled by the lexeme horse, which 
realizes the sememe HORSE. l 9  
But consider an expression like glide smoothly or pierce through the 
cushion. A possibility of analyzing the meaning of glide as GO + SMOOTH and 
of pierce as GO + THROUGH has already been touched upon. SMOOTH and 
THROUGH are supposed to be inherent features in this analysis. The expres- 
sions glide smoothly and pierce through the cushion should therefore be 
semantically redundant, just as male boy is. But actually, they are not. 
In cases like these a semantic unit that is supposed to be incorporated as an 
obligatory element is, as it were, projected on the syntagmatic axis. 
5.3.1. We will first discuss cases like pierce through the cushion. Compare 
the following: 
(la) go through the cushion 
(Ib) pierce through the cushion 
(lc) pierce the cushion 
Here two semantic units, GOand THROUGH, areinvolved. In (la) THROUGH is 
not an obligatory element for GO. In (lb) and (lc), on the other hand, it is an 
obligatory element for Go.  The unit GO in (la) and the one in (Ib) and (lc) 
have therefore to be distinguished; we will keep the representation GO for the 
former and use PIERCE for the latter. PIERCE presupposes a semantic unit that 
consists of a relating feature THROUGH and a proper feature SPACE (in which 
the former feature may or may not be incorporated). 
Now it will easily be seen that there is an obvious structural parallelism 
between a set of terms, "a relating feature" and "a proper feature," which we 
have used in discussing incorporation, on the one hand, and a set of terms, "a 
sememe referring to functional property" and "a sememe referring to inherent 
property," which we have used in discussing presupposition, on the other. If 
We reread THROUGH + SPACE as SPACE AS PATH and think that THROUGH is 
a specification of the function PATH, then the structural parallelism between 
it and semantic units like ANIMATE AS AGENT, HUMAN AS BENEFICIARY, 
CONCRETE AS OBJECT, etc., will be obvious. This brings us to  a generalization, 
namely, a sememe of 'action' type presupposes a semantic unit that consists of 
a sememe referring to functional property and a sememe (or a set of sememes) 
referring to  inherent property. The sememe referring to functional property 
may or may not be incorporated. Whether or not it is incorporated is a 
matter for individual sememes. PIERCE allows either incorporation or non- 
incorporation. But compare the following: 
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(2a) get to the station 
(2b) reach the station 
In either case, a semantic unit, LOCATION AS GOAL, is involved. The sememe 
GOAL can be incorporated only in (2b); in (2a), however, non-incorporation 
is the only possibility. 
It is quite possible to conceive of alanguage in which the sememes referring 
to functional property are always realized by certain forms (whether particles 
or case-forms) and in which therefore the notion of incorporation does not 
have to be applied to their description. In fact, it can even be eliminated from 
the description of English, if we take syntactic positions ("subject-position," 
"direct-object-position," etc.) as realizing the functional property. For 
example, if we think that the direct-object-position realizes the functional 
property GOAL in (2c), then reach no longer incorporates GOAL but presup- 
poses it (just as in the case of (2b)); the difference is simply that the GOAL is 
realized by a preposition in (2b) and by the syntactic position of object in (2c). 
Of more interest seen in a broader perspective is the question whether or 
not the presupposed semantic unit involving a sememe referring to functional 
property and a sememe (or a set of sememes) referring to inherent property is 
obligatorily actualized in the utterance. Intralinguistically, there are differ- 
ences in this respect according to the kind of the functional sememe involved. 
A sememe referring to AGENT, for example, usually seems to have a greater 
probability of actualization than one referring to INSTRUMENT or LOCATION. 
But here there are interlinguistic differences, too. A language of 'subject- 
prominent' type generally shows a greater degree of obligatoriness in this 
respect than a language of 'topic-prominent' type." Thus, where a subject- 
prominent language like English says I ate i t ,  Japanese, a topic-prominent 
language, would simply say the equivalent of ate, leaving the presupposition 
as to the agent and the object unactualized. Notice that as an utterance in a 
particular context either expression is semantically equally complete. The 
presuppositional relationship is the same and offers the same possibility of 
interpretation for the hearer. The only difference is that what fulfills this 
relationship is explicitly stated in one but is implicitly given by context in the 
other. 
One implication of this is that a subject-prominent language shows a 
greater degree of independence from the context, and a topic-prominent 
language shows a greater degree of dependence on it. It is a well-known fact 
that the children of a subject-prominent language community start with 
utterances of topic-comment type (which are grammatically "looser" and 
more context-dependent) and undergo a process of acquiring rules to produce 
sentences of subject-predicate type (which are more context-independent). It 
will also be interesting to note that in the highly honorific way of saying things 
in Japanese, even the agent (which, in the subject-prominent language, is 
typically associated with the subject and is therefore a highly obligatory 
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element) is represented as if it were a location (which is naturally more prone 
to be suppressed) where something takes place. Thus referring to the Emperor, 
one might say the equivalent of At the Emperor, eating came to pass. 
5.3.2. Next comes the problem of glide smoothly. The expression may 
indeed be mildly redundant from a semantic point of view, but by no means 
intolerably so. Several factors seem to be involved in producing this effect. It 
is quite legitimate to suspect that one of the semantic components incorporated 
in GLIDE is not exactly the same as the sememe that is realized as smoothly. 
But consider first a very similar case like young boy. YOUNG (or NON-ADULT) 
is often posited as one of the semantic components of the sememe BOY, and 
this component is usually identified as the sememe realized as the lexeme 
young. The expression young boy should therefore be semantically redun- 
dant, but it is by no means so. 
Now the impression one gets from an expression like this is that the feature 
of 'being young' in particular is given special emphasis.21 But this is clearly not 
the whole story, because male boy would sound unnatural even under the 
same assumption. The difference between young boy and *male boy lies in 
the fact that 'being young' is a matter of degree but'being male'is not (cf, very 
young-*very male), so that it is possible in the case of YOUNG to emphasize in 
particular its comparatively higher degree, while this is not possible for MALE. 
There is a certain parallelism between this situation with young boy and the 
one in which expressions like walk on foot, sail by ship, drive by car, and 
swim in the water are felt more or less semantically redundant, while expres- 
sions like walk on one foot, sail on an ocean liner, drive in a new car, and 
swim in the muddy water are not. The latter expressions specify particular 
instances falling within an allowable range. "Specification" can be used as a 
term covering the cases just mentioned and those like young boy. Thus 
specification reduces the impression of semantic redundancy, because it adds 
certain new information. 
Still another factor may be at work in an  expression like ride on horseback. 
If this expression is quite commonly used (in spite of its apparent semantic 
redundancy), it is perhaps because the addition of on horseback excludes the 
other possible meanings of ride (e.g., referring to a car, a train, etc.). 
But perhaps more relevant than all these is a certain psychological tendency 
of ours. If a semantic unit is incorporated, its identity is lost in the new totality it 
now constitutes. The semerne BOY may indeed incorporate YOUNG, but then 
this YOUNG does not have the same effect on the speaker as presumably the 
same semantic unit YOUNG that is realized as the lexeme young. Some 
semantic units (e.g., MALE) may resist this tendency,*%ut those which allow 
of different degrees and specification are easily affected. Our mind does not 
react alike to something that is there and to something that is not there. This 
inevitably brings indeterminate factors into any semantic analysis that 
assumes incorporating processes among semantic units. 
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NOTES 
I. For a fuller discuss~on of this point, see Ikegami (19771, 
2. Jakobson (1936) quotes the follow~ng c lam of Hjelmslev (1935-37) w ~ t h  approval: 
"Em Kasus wie eine Sprachform uber haupt bedeutet n~cht  elntge versch~edene D~nge,  er bedeutet 
eln e~nziges Dtng, er trhgt einen elnzlgen abstrakten Begr~ff, auf dem man d ~ e  konkreten 
Verwendungen ableiten kann." 
3. Jakobson's preferred term here IS "Gesamtbedeutung " 
4. Moreover, the Grundbedeutung approach wtll fail to  account for obvlous polysemy 
of the kind one finds In an expresslon l ~ k e  the nlar75 nt~rrder ("transformationa1ly"related etther 
to the rrran rnurderedx o r t o  Xmurdererlrhe ttlan) The fallure ofthe Grundbedeutung approach 
1s due to the fact that by look~ng for a common semantlc denom~nator for all the poss~ble uses of 
a lexeme, ~t d~sregards even those s~gn~ficant  semantic contrasts that the lexeme contracts with 
other lexemes In a certain part~cular set of environments 
5 Cf Wlttgenstein's often quoted c lam that the mean~ngof a word 1s tts use in the language 
6 The meaning of rhrlrlas a kinsh~p term, together with 11s other special~zed meanings, IS 
here d~sregarded 
7. In most cases, these types of real~zat~onal relat~onship are found In comb~nation w ~ t h  
each other-a relat~on described by Lamb by the term "~nterlocking " 
8. If func t~on~ng l ~ k e  a grammatical subject is taken to constitute the "mean~ng" of the 
lexeme there, then the example does not belong here But this depends upon how onedef~nes the 
"mean~ng" of a lex~cal item. 
9. Cf. Gruber (1976 sec 1 2). 
10 Thus there 3s clearly a l im~t  o how far the analogy between the phonolog~cal and the 
semant~c system can go. Coser~u (as expounded by Geckeler [I971 1951). for example. talks 
about the "archilexeme" (e.g., Mencl h in contrast to the "lexemes" Mann and Frau) by analogy 
w ~ t h  the archtphoneme (tn contrast to the phoneme) But an arch~lexeme here can very well be a 
lexeme (as IS in fact the case w ~ t h  Mettsth), hence ~t does not belong to a d~fferent stratum from 
the lexeme 
I I By M A N  is meant a different sememe from M A N ,  (= 'human'). 
12 This does not, of course. imply that all "dev~ant" expressions w~l l  be prov~ded with a 
metaphor~cal interpretation. They may be branded as nonsense strlngs Whether a dev~ant 
expresslon IS judged metaphor~cal or nonsens~cal is not a matter of degree of dev~ance but of 
contextual constraints. wh~ch may or may not make a plaus~ble rernterpretatlon poss~ble 
13. Accord~ng to F~llmore (1969). the meantng of such a lexeme as hathelor ~ s d ~ v ~ d e d  Into 
presupposltlon (HUMAN. MALF. ADULT) and assertion (UNMARRIED) F~llmore speaks as ~f the 
d ~ v t s ~ o n  tnto thetwo parts were f~xed  for the mean~ngof a lexeme This 1s of course false Suppose 
there IS a party to wh~ch only bachelors and spinsters are ~ n v ~ t e d .  Ifsomeone says In thls party. 
T/tot perso?t rs a hathelor, then 11 IS M A L E  that 1s asserted and HUMA'*I A D U L T ,  and U N M A R R I E D  
constktute the presuppositlon. The d~s t inc t~on  between assertion and presuppositlon depends on 
the part~cular context In wh~ch the lexeme IS used F~llmore's d~scuss~on IS m~slead~ng In that ~t 
disregards t h ~ s  crucral polnt. 
14, The view here thus stands in contrast to Chomsky's treatment, supported on purely 
formal grounds (Chomsky 1965.1 14-1 15). In wh~ch the cho~ce of the verb IS constratned by a free 
cho~ce of nouns w ~ t h  certatn features ass~gned to them It w~l l  perhaps be worthwh~le tocons~der 
a poss~ble correlat~on between the cho~ce of descr~pt~ve models and the typological d~s t lnc t~on  
between subject-prominent (or noun-centered) language and toplc-promrnent (or verb-centered) 
language. 
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15 The fact that thereare cases of personification does not, of course, contradict thls point. 
ification is In fact possible because of the norm that strpulates that rNANrMATE is NON- 
16 I am not going into a d~scuss~on f the definition of the agent, see Cruse (1973). 1 would 
polnt out here only that the notron of the agent may not only be~ndeterrnrnate within one 
uage, depending on what criteria one adopts, but it may also vary between different 
uages Thus, for example, the association of the A G E N T W I ~ ~  ANlMATEneSS IS muchstronger in 
nese than English, so that presented with a sentence llke The \clo~ri opened the door or its 
Japanese equivalent, the Japanese speaker would feel more personification than the Engllsh 
,peaker. See Ikegami (Ms.). 
17. See Ikegami (1976a, 1976b); also Hjelmslev (1935-37) and Anderson (1971). 
18. For the close connection between SOURCE and AGENT, one can refer to the fact that 
many languages use the SOURCE marker for marking the AGENT. It is also significant that the 
SOURCE marker does appear when the agent is (as in the passwe) not placed In its privileged 
position in a sentence. 
The hypothesis proposed here also accounts for the semantic difference pointed out by 
Green (1974:157) between Johr~ taught Mary Et~glirh and John raughr English to Mars. In the 
former sentence, Mary is placed In a prrvileged posrtion as a term referring to a human being, 
while in the latter Mary is represented simply as a location intended as goal. It IS natural, there- 
fore, that the former sentence IS associated with the successful mastery (at least to a certain 
extent) of English, while the latter leaves the point open. 
Flnally, the relatron between LOCATION and ~ O s s ~ s s o R  concerns the typological contrast 
(already polnted out by lssatschenko[1974]) between the BE-languageand the HA VE-language. 
See Ikegami (1976b and 1978). 
19. Weinreich (1966) once proposed to describe the same situation In terms of "transfer 
features." Thus mlgh (he would say) has a transfer feature HORSE, which IS transferred to the 
other lexerne with which neigh comes into combination. While it IS true that thls ~ s a  convenient 
way of accounting for metaphor, it obviously produces redundancy when applied to a sentence 
like A horse neighed, because the feature H O R S E ~ S  already there with the lexeme horse. Anad hoc 
rule to delete the redundant feature will then be needed. 
20. For the typological distinction, see LI (1976). 
21. An extension of this usage IS the so-called "non-restrictive" (as contrasted with 
"restrictive") use of an adjective: e.g., fair Ol~helra, nPhite Tno\t1 Note that the qualities projected 
are not necessarily d~stinctlve for the meanrng of the head noun. 
22. The surest way of producing the effect of redundancy is the repetition of the same (or 
partially the same) lexemic forms. (The unacceptabillty of ( r o s  acres certainly owes to  this. cf. 
cross over to .)  But if the repeated Item (even though closely synonymous) differs formally, our 
l~ngu~stic  nst~nct dictates that there must be some difference in meaning and that the repeated 
item does not simply repeat exactly the same meanlng. 
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